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{introduction}
iiT Chicago-Kent College of Law is a vibrant com-
munity of scholars.  Each year we welcome new visiting 
professors of legal writing and fellows with a variety 
of specialties. These programs are intended to provide 
the time, space, mentoring, and resources needed 
to launch academic careers, while we reap the bene-
fit of their energy, enthusiasm, friendship, and new 
approaches. in this issue, we focus on the innovative 
work of some of these junior scholars, and juxtapose 
them with one of the most renowned and senior mem-
bers of our faculty. We are particularly excited that, as 
intended, some of our junior scholars will be moving 
to new faculties. We will miss them, but we wish them 
the very best of luck. in the coming months, the cycle 
will continue, and new junior scholars will join us as 
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published in n.Y.U. Journal of intellectual property 
& Entertainment Law
ip Fellow
Bs, University of Washington
Jd, University of Washington
Joy Xiang’s expertise is in global patent practice, patent counseling, patent procurement and portfolio development. She has worked in the high-tech industry since 1996, in roles 
such as software engineer and program manager for Motorola and later as in-house counsel 
for Microsoft.
 Ms. Xiang was educated in law, public policy, technology entrepreneurship, and com-
puter science. After practicing law for 10 years, she appreciates being in academia, where she 
can use her accumulated learning and experiences and expand her understanding through re-
search and discussions with students and colleagues. Ms. Xiang’s research currently focuses on 
exploring ways to enhance systems and communities for better innovation and collaboration.
For more, visit her faculty webpage here.
Joy Y. Xiang
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in December 2009, at the 15th global climate change confer-ence in Copenhagen, leaders from 115 nations gathered to negotiate an international agreement for addressing climate 
change. The agreement was expected to include provisions to 
enhance the international transfer of technologies capable of 
adapting to or mitigating climate change. Unfortunately, the 
talks stalled. Developed and developing nations disagreed on 
a host of issues, especially the treatment of intellectual prop-
erty rights (“ipR”) protecting clean technologies. Even before 
the Copenhagen conference, developing nations proposed to 
exclude clean technologies held by developed nations from 
patent protection. Developed nations, meanwhile, considered 
that ipR should not be part of the global climate change nego-
tiations and proposed to remove provisions dealing with ipR 
from the negotiations.
The Copenhagen conference resulted in a non-binding 
An excerpt from Addressing Climate Change: Domestic innovation, international Aid and 
Collaboration, 5 N.Y.U. Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law 196 (2015).
Addressing ClimAte 
ChAnge
Domestic innovation, international Aid and 
Collaboration
By Joy y. XiaNG
“[T]he question before us is no longer the nature of the 
challenge – the question is our capacity to meet it.” 
 - Barack Obama
  iit chicAgo-Kent FAculty PersPectives
Addressing Climate Change
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agreement that did not reference ipR 
issues. nevertheless, the debate regarding 
ipR persisted through the subsequent 
global climate change negotiations. The 
global climate change conference, held 
in Lima in December 2014, presented 
both developed nations’ and developing 
nations’ positions regarding ipR as equal 
options to be negotiated at the next glob-
al climate change conference in paris in 
December 2015. The agreement resulting 
from the 2015 paris conference, however, 
did not mention ipR issues; just as in the 
Copenhagen conference, the preference 
of developing nations was not reflected. 
The debate regarding the treatment of ipR in the climate change context 
breaks down as follows: developed nations 
insist on strong ipR for clean technolo-
gies, viewing ipR as indispensable for 
incentivizing the development of such 
technologies and facilitating their deploy-
ment. Conversely, developing nations 
have sought to weaken or even remove 
ipR for clean technologies, viewing the 
existence of ipR as a major barrier to the 
international transfer of clean technolo-
gies.
Hence, an ongoing divide exists be-
tween developed and developing nations 
regarding the role of ipR in the interna-
tional transfer of clean technologies for 
addressing climate change.  international 
agencies such as the World Trade Organi-
zation (“WTO”), the World intellectual 
property Organization (“WipO”), the 
United nations Environmental pro-
gramme (“UnEp”), the World Meteoro-
logical Organization, and the World Bank 
have all initiated discussions to resolve the 
divide. The stakeholders in this discussion 
include governments, public entities, and 
commercial entities from developed and 
developing nations, and those with in-
terests in combatting climate change. To 
date, these shareholders are still searching 
for effective solutions. 
As discussed in part i.B, addressing 
climate change is a pressing issue; in 
order to meet the 2°C goal, we need to 
reduce 60% of the anthropogenic gHg 
emissions by 2050, using 2000 as a base 
line. Rapid development and deployment 
of clean technologies to meet this goal re-
quires developed and developing nations 
to act independently and collaboratively.
in the past two decades, global cli-
mate change technology efforts have fo-
cused on the transfer of clean technologies 
from developed nations to developing 
nations.  The UnFCCC system and the 
TRipS Agreement have provided multi-
ple mechanisms to promote such transfer. 
However, the international transfer of 
clean technologies to developing nations 
has been limited, especially to the least 
developed countries (“LDC”s) and the 
mid-tier developing nations (“MDC”s). 
As shown in the figure below, most trans-
fers occur among developed nations, and 
the transfers to developing nations have 
“[a]n ongoing divide exists between developing 
and developed nations regarding the role of iPr in 
the international transfer of clean technologies for 
addressing climate change.”
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Joy Y. Xiang
mostly gone to the emerging economies.
One may ask: why has transfer of clean technologies to developing nations 
been limited? is the existence of ipR in fact 
a major barrier to the international trans-
fer of clean technologies? After reviewing 
and analyzing currently available data on 
clean technologies and scholarship regard-
ing international technology transfer, this 
article finds that the existence of ipR has 
not been a major barrier to the interna-
tional transfer of clean technologies. This 
article also finds that for a nation to attract 
inbound transfer of foreign technologies, 
it needs to offer: sufficient ipR protection, 
the capacity to absorb and adopt foreign 
technologies, sufficient market size, policy 
certainty, and transparency.  Likely due to 
a lack of some of such capacity, most de-
veloping nations – e.g., the LDCs and the 
MDCs – have had difficulties attracting 
foreign clean technologies.
As the analysis in part ii.A shows, 
the existence of ipR has not been a major 
roadblock for the transfer of clean tech-
nologies to developing nations. instead, 
lack of proper ipR protection for clean 
technologies may impede the internation-
al transfer of clean technologies. Com-
mercial sectors in developed nations play 
a significant role in the development and 
transfer of clean technologies, and they 
are concerned about losing their control 
of the technologies to be transferred if 
developing nations do not offer proper 
ipR protections. Therefore, developing 
nations need to offer ipR in order to 
attract inbound transfer of clean tech-
nologies.  However, developing nations 
should be allowed to customize their ipR 
protections to address the realities of their 
countries’ economic development. Strong 
ipR protections may not benefit all de-
veloping nations equally. For developing 
nations that currently rely on duplicative 
imitation of foreign practices for technol-
ogy development, strong ipR protections 
will likely inhibit such practice and hence 
the growth of domestic industries.   
Meanwhile, ipR is just one of the 
conditions enabling developing nations 
SpRing 2016 [ 8 ]
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to attract inbound transfer of clean tech-
nologies. According to the analysis in part 
ii.B, in order to attract inbound transfer 
of foreign clean technologies, a developing 
nation also needs to have certain capacity. 
Such capacity includes a good investment 
environment (such as market conditions, 
policy clarity and transparency), open-
ness to trade for attracting international 
technology transfer, and domestic sci-
entific infrastructure and human capital 
for absorbing and implementing foreign 
technologies into the local production 
process.  
Developed nations can help develop-ing nations – especially the MDCs 
and the LDCs – build up the capacity 
to attract and implement foreign clean 
technologies. Because of climate change’s 
global impact and developed nations’ his-
torical contributions to climate change, 
developed nations have the self-interest 
and moral duty to help developing nations 
address climate change, e.g., via interna-
tional aid. Furthermore, the governments 
of developed nations can set up domestic 
initiatives and mechanisms to encourage 
their commercial sectors to transfer clean 
technologies to developing nations. 
This article proposes that domestic 
innovation, international aid and inter-
national technology collaboration should 
be the focus, rather than international 
transfer of clean technologies, in order 
to effectively address climate change via 
clean technologies. The proposal aims to 
encourage the rapid and sustainable de-
velopment and deployment of clean tech-
nologies, while addressing the factors that 
likely have induced the limited amount of 
transfer of clean technologies to develop-
ing nations during the past two decades.
The proposed solution has three 
prongs. First, both developed nations 
and developing nations should stimulate 
domestic innovations on clean tech-
nologies by leveraging diverse tools for 
encouraging innovations. This includes 
developed nations optimizing their ipR 
systems to encourage advancements in 
clean technologies, along with developing 
nations building customized ipR systems 
reflecting their national realities. Second, 
developed nations and even the emerging 
economies should provide financial and 
technical aid to developing nations, espe-
cially the MDCs and the LDCs, to help 
them combat climate change and build 
the sustainable national capacity to at-
tract, absorb and implement foreign clean 
technologies. Third, when applicable, 
developed nations and developing nations 
should construct collaboration platforms 
for clean technology developments that 
would benefit both parties.
in summary, the focus on the inter-
national transfer of clean technologies to 
developing nations in order to address cli-
mate change has not worked well during 
the past two decades. This article analyzes 
evidential data on clean technologies and 
their transfer and finds that the existence 
of ipR has not been a major barrier to 
such transfer, as suggested by developing 
nations during the debates with developed 
nations on how to improve the situation. 
This article also studies possible reasons 
for the currently limited transfer of clean 
technologies to developing nations and 
concludes that developed and developing 
nations need to work together to improve 
the situation. Specifically, developing 
nations need to improve their national 
capacities in attracting, absorbing, and 
implementing foreign clean technologies, 
Addressing Climate Change
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Climate Change and Technology Transfer: Innova-
tion, Collaboration, and International Aid (Ed-
ward Elgar publishing, forthcoming 2017).
Articles
How Wide Should the gate of Technology Be 
-- Business Method patentability in China, 11 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 795 (2002).
and developed nations have the moral 
duty and self-interest to provide concrete 
and effective assistance to developing 
nations in building such capacities and 
in helping developing nations address 
climate change. By understanding and 
addressing these possible reasons, this ar-
ticle proposes that we focus on domestic 
innovation of clean technologies, inter-
national aid and collaboration, instead 
of international transfer of clean technol-
ogies. This approach makes possible and 
sustainable the needed rapid development 
and deployment – including international 
transfer – of clean technologies, which 
is essential for us to successfully address 
climate change.
Joy Y. Xiang
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{Family Law}
Biology, genetics, 
nurture, And the lAw 
the eXPaNsioN of the leGal 
DeFInITIon	oF	FaMILy	To	IncLuDe	
Three	or	More	LegaL	ParenTs
published in nevada Law Journal
Visiting Assistant professor of Law
aB, Harvard University
Jd, Columbia University School of Law
Myrisha Lewis teaches legal writing at Chicago-Kent and specializes in areas related to family law and criminal law. prior to joining the Chicago-Kent faculty in 2015, she 
spent approximately four years as an attorney at the U.S. nuclear Regulatory Commission 
in Rockville, Maryland. There, she filed pleadings on behalf of agency staff, advised legal and 
technical staff on federal rulemakings and statutes, and reviewed staff analyses of new nuclear 
power reactor licenses and designs. While employed by the U.S. nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, professor Lewis also completed a seven-month detail in the Sex Offense and Domestic 
Violence Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C., as a Special Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, where she prosecuted domestic violence misdemeanor cases.
 professor Lewis’ research and teaching interests include family law, criminal law, com-
parative constitutional law, European Union law, administrative law, trusts and estates, bio-
ethics, and torts. Her articles have been published in the Wisconsin Journal of Law, gender 
and Society and the Charleston Law Review. She has a forthcoming article in the nevada Law 
Journal.
 professor Lewis earned a law degree from Columbia Law School and an A.B. in gov-
ernment from Harvard University. During law school, she was a case law editor of the Colum-
bia Journal of European Law and a teaching assistant for a seminar on international Environ-
mental Law. professor Lewis is a member of the new York Bar and speaks French and Spanish.
 
For more, visit her faculty webpage here.
myrisha s. lewis
[Hi-res image]
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in 2000, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[t]he demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak 
of an average American family.” As a result of 
these demographic changes, “[m]any children are 
now raised in non-conventional settings.” These 
“non-conventional settings” include settings oc-
cupied by stepfamilies, single parents, extended 
family members, individuals who are not genet-
ically or biologically related to the children, 
and same-sex partnerships and marriages. On June 
26, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell 
v. Hodges that the fundamental right to mar-
ry applies to same-sex couples. in doing so, the 
Court noted that a “basis for protecting the 
right to marry is that it safeguards children 
and families.” While children of same-sex cou-
ples will now benefit from the recognition of 
their parents’ marital relationships and the re-
sulting legal protection of their parent-child 
An excerpt from Biology, genetics, nurture, and the Law: The Expansion of the Legal 
Definition of Family to include Three or More Legal parents, 16 Nevada Law Journal 743 
(2016).
BiologY, genetiCs,  
nurture, And the lAw
The Expansion of the Legal Definition of Family to 
include Three or More Legal parents
By	MyrIsha	s.	LewIs
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relationships, these children, and other 
children of “non-conventional settings,” 
will continue to form relationships with 
individuals who are “parents” from the 
children’s perspective, but not legally. Such 
relationships still need protection and “safe-
guarding.” 
The legal implications of these afore-mentioned “non-conventional settings” 
have been at issue in several other Supreme 
Court cases including: Michael H. v. gerald 
D., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, and 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby girl. As a result, 
the law has had to adapt to recognize new 
foundations for parentage and will likely 
continue to do so.
Currently, there are at least five bases for 
recognizing parentage:
1. Biology, as evidenced by the pre-
sumption that a woman who gives birth to a 
child is that child’s parent;
2. genetics, which is recognized by 
the Uniform parentage Act and is most im-
portant in the recognition (or disproving) of 
paternity;
3. intent, which is recognized in cer-
tain jurisdictions such as California, where a 
court will conclude—especially when assist-
ed-reproductive technology is at issue—that 
the “parties who had contracted for and in-
tended the pregnancy . . . were [the child’s] 
legal parents and had support obligations 
that flowed therefrom,” even though neither 
parent is biologically (or genetically) related 
to the child;
4. Marriage, as evidenced by the mar-
ital presumption, which purports that the 
husband is the father of a child born into 
the marriage; and
5. Functional or de facto parentage, 
which is based on a putative parent’s actions. 
These many bases for parentage, com-
bined with the realities of reproduction, 
cohabitation, and family interaction, are 
the reason why children can have more than 
two parents. in many states, however, to 
have three instead of two parents is legally 
impossible. For example, statutory restric-
tions may require the demonstration of one 
or two legal parents’ unfitness as parents 
before a third party can be granted parental 
rights; these restrictions also prevent the 
assertion of de facto parenthood. Limiting 
the number of parents a child can have is 
noticeably disadvantageous for a child with 
three fit, putative parents, as the child would 
be deprived of a parent-child relationship. 
indeed, without the legal recognition of 
full parentage, children may be deprived of 
important sources of financial support and 
contact with their perceived parents, which 
may be traumatic to them.
in light of social and demographic 
changes during the past century, this article 
seeks to resolve the questions of who should 
be recognized as a parent and what the crite-
ria for legal recognition of parentage should 
[“limiting the number of parents a child can have 
is noticeably disadvantageous for a child with three 
fit, putative parents, as the child would be deprived 
of a parent-child relationship.”]
Myrisha S. Lewis
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be. Many other articles focus solely on the 
parental rights of a group that is marginal-
ized when it comes to legal recognition of 
their significant roles in a child’s life, such 
as the rights of grandparents, lesbians, same-
sex parents, or stepparents. Similarly, the 
literature that focuses on children’s rights as 
related to parental recognition tends to clas-
sify children by certain subsets, focusing, for 
example, on the rights of children of same-
sex couples. This article departs from the ex-
isting literature’s approach, instead address-
ing stepparent adoption, same-sex couples, 
grandparent visitation, and assisted repro-
ductive technology by creating a solution 
from the perspective of the “best interests of 
the child”—the historical leading standard 
in children’s protection—rather than from 
the perspective of the parents’ rights. it is 
likely that legislatures are not familiar with 
exactly how the best interests of the child 
standard operates in practice because it is a 
family law standard that generally arises in 
an adjudicatory context. This legislative un-
familiarity should not prevent state legisla-
tures from including provisions in parentage 
statutes and hopefully conducting legislative 
inquiries into the best interests of the child 
through expert testimony and research. 
Drawing from the best interests of the child standard, this article introduces 
a new doctrine for parental recognition, 
“parentage in praxi,” which requires (1) that 
a putative parent complete statutorily delin-
eated requirements that culminate in them 
standing “in the shoes of a parent,” and (2) 
that state law operate to allow a child to 
have more than two parents—if doing so 
would be in the best interests of the child. A 
parent in praxi would have the same rights 
and obligations as a legal parent. This article 
borrows professor Susan Frelich Appleton’s 
term of “original parent” to refer to the 
parents that the law currently identifies as 
legal parents (those parents who are deemed 
parents when the child is born). By recog-
nizing parentage in praxi, states can protect 
the relationships that children have formed 
with putative parents who may not be cur-
rently recognized as legal parents, regardless 
of the parents’ legal status in any sphere not 
concerning the well-being of the child (e.g., 
marital status, familial status, or gender).
A discussion of parental rights in the 
context of the best interests of the child 
is inescapable. parents have certain enu-
merated rights and responsibilities that are 
constitutionally recognized.  professor Su-
san Frelich Appleton noted that “the [U.S. 
Supreme] Court has ‘recognized the funda-
mental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children,’” which led her to conclude 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
the primacy of parental rights under the 
Due process Clause.” Other scholars note,
going back to the 1920s in cases like 
Meyer v. nebraska and pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, the Supreme Court has held that 
parents have a fundamental constitutional 
right to raise their children without state 
interference. Custody orders, public school 
policies, or other state action that sharply 
limit the child-rearing role of either parent, 
the argument goes, substantially burden 
that right, triggering strict judicial scrutiny. 
And, under strict scrutiny, the state must 
show some “compelling interest”—such as 
imminent harm to the child—to justify its 
intervention. incantation of more amor-
phous interests, including the “best inter-
ests” of children, is insufficient.
Yet, the best interests of the child are 
frequently considered in state actions such 
as custody orders that could be viewed 
as limiting the role of a parent. Custody 
orders are commonplace. When there are 
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Sex and Statutory Uniformity: Harmonizing the 
Legal Treatment of Semen, 7 Charleston Law Re-
view 235 (2012-13).
Making Sex the Same: Ending the Unfair Treat-
ment of Males in Family Law, 27 Wisconsin Jour-
nal of Law, Gender & Society 257 (2012).
multiple parents, they must share their 
parental rights and responsibilities, and 
the recognition of a second or third parent 
does not upset the constitutional balance 
between parental rights and the best inter-
ests of the child. The child has a right to 
maintain emotional bonds with multiple 
legally-recognized parents, and it is gen-
erally in the child’s best interest to do so. 
parentage in praxi draws its origins from de facto parentage, which will be ex-
plained in the introduction of this article. 
part i discusses the best interests of the child 
standard and the role of a parent. part ii con-
ducts an in-depth analysis of statutory and 
doctrinal de facto parentage (the doctrine 
upon which parentage in praxi is based) 
and other doctrines that recognize individ-
uals’ functional parental roles, including the 
Uniform parentage Act, in loco parentis, 
psychological parentage, and visitation. 
Throughout part ii, the theory of parentage 
in praxi is expanded, and it is compared to 
existing legal doctrines for the preservation 
of third parties’ rights. This comparison 
also highlights some of the drawbacks of 
parentage in praxi and other doctrines, then 
builds upon these drawbacks. part iV briefly 
explores the possibility of children actually 
having three genetic parents, made possible 
by scientific techniques pending approval in 
the United States and recently approved for 
human subjects trials in the United King-
dom.
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forthcoming in Rutgers University Law Review
Visiting Assistant professor of Law
Ba, University of Florida
Jd, The University of Chicago Law School
Seth Oranburg’s scholarship focuses on areas related to business law. Before joining the Chicago-Kent faculty in 2015, he taught courses on Corporations, Closely Held Business 
Organizations, and Electronic Discovery of Digital Evidence at the Florida State University 
College of Law. professor Oranburg’s practice experience includes corporate venture capital 
transactions in Silicon Valley, CA, and antitrust litigation in Washington, DC.
 professor Oranburg’s scholarship in business law includes crowdfunding, securities 
regulations, and shareholder activism. He has recently published articles in the Fordham Jour-
nal of Corporate & Financial Law, the Cornell Journal of Law & public policy, and the Rutgers 
University Law Review. He also has written for the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog and 
been interviewed by the Wall Street Journal and AboveTheLaw.com. 
 professor Oranburg graduated with honors from the University of Chicago Law 
School, where he was a member of the Order of the Coif and a Kirkland & Ellis Scholar. He 
earned his bachelor’s degree from the University of Florida, magna cum laude, with a double 
major in political science and English. professor Oranburg is a member of the State Bar of 
California and the Bar of the District of Columbia.
For more, visit his faculty webpage here.
seth C. oranburg
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Supporters of the Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups (“JOBS”) Act of 2012, such as president Barack Obama, claim that law will democratize 
startups by “help[ing] entrepreneurs raise the capital 
they need to put Americans back to work and create 
an economy that’s built to last.” The law might accom-
plish this by allowing startups to sell crowdfunding 
stock directly to the general public through internet 
portals. But the JOBS Act does not provide a way 
for investors to resell crowdfunding stock. investors 
must hold crowdfunding stock until the company goes 
public (or otherwise liquidates), which could take 
ten years or more. With so much uncertainty in the 
interim, investors have good reasons to be skeptical 
and not buy crowdfunding stock under the JOBS Act. 
 This Article advocates that democratizing start-
ups requires allowing resale of crowdfunding stock. 
This Article proposes “Rule 144B,” a regulatory provi-
sion that could be enacted without an act of Congress, 
to permit transparent web-based venture exchanges 
A summary of Democratizing Startups, 68 Rutgers University Law Review (forthcoming 2016).
demoCrAtizing stArtups
private independent Analysts
By seth c. oraNBurG
[ 19 ]spring 2016
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with fraud-prevention intermediar-
ies termed “private independent an-
alysts” to resell crowdfunding stock. 
To create a resale exemption that works, scholars and regulators first need to 
understand what could cause such a resale 
market to fail.  The failure of past venture 
exchanges—platforms where private-com-
pany stock can be traded—can be attribut-
ed to the fact that companies on venture 
exchanges have the corporate governance 
problems of both private corporations and 
public corporations, with few of the bene-
fits. On one hand, exchange participants 
lack the investor protections typically found 
in VC arrangements, such as active moni-
toring and restrictive covenants that protect 
against information asymmetries and entre-
preneurs’ opportunism. On the other hand, 
exchange participants lack the information 
typically provided by public company list-
ing requirements. The information problem 
is compounded by the fact that exchanges 
may lack incentives to require their listed 
companies to make disclosures or to po-
lice those disclosures for completeness and 
accuracy. Crowdfunding investors may be 
especially vulnerable to these problems be-
cause they are not necessarily accredited or 
sophisticated.
instead of taking on the worst problems 
of both VC-funded and publicly-traded 
companies, this Article proposes that a 
“144B” exchange could be used to incentiv-
ize corporations seeking liquidity to adopt 
corporate governance that reflects their most 
successful practices. Therefore, the crux of 
the 144B exchange must be to return the 
power of monitoring and disciplining 
management to the stockholders. This can 
be accomplished by installing a quasi-VC 
called the “private independent analyst” or 
“piA.” The piA would represent the share-
holders on the venture exchange much like 
a VC manager represents the members of its 
VC fund, except the piA’s compensation is 
not based on stock performance. Rule 144B 
could require all companies listed on a 144B 
exchange to provide contractual control 
rights to the piA, similar to those found in 
VC contracts. For example, the piA would 
have the right to attend board meetings, 
vote on fundamental corporate transactions 
(including mergers, major acquisitions, and 
sales of substantially all assets), prevent the 
company from issuing more stock, prevent 
the company from taking on a large senior 
debt, and vote on management salaries.
in addition to contractual control rights 
that are similar to what a VC would receive, 
the piA would also have responsibilities to 
produce valuable public information. in 
the public-company context, stock analysts 
review publicly available information and 
often have private access to corporate man-
agement. The analyst reviews corporate and 
systemic information, and reports whether 
the company is correctly valued by its stock 
price. This is a valuable service because it 
centralizes efforts that would otherwise 
have to be duplicated by all stockholders. 
This reduces the cost of monitoring a cor-
poration and reduces shareholders’ rational 
apathy problems. Analyst reports are inte-
gral to overcoming corporate governance 
problems, but it is hard for smaller firms to 
attract analyst coverage. By requiring 144B 
exchange-traded companies to produce an-
alyst reports, the micro-cap companies on 
144B exchanges could actually have fewer 
corporate governance problems than small-
cap companies on national stock exchanges.
Applying the piA model to 144B 
exchanges potentially solves the most seri-
ous problem faced by venture exchanges. 
Venture exchanges may become a “market 
for lemons” if companies use the venture 
exchange as a staging ground to catapult 
into better-regarded markets.  The most 
successful companies on a venture exchange 
may transfer to a better-regarded exchange 
Seth C. Oranburg
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in order to signal that the company is of 
higher quality. But this also signals that 
the remaining firms on the exchange are of 
lower quality, which encourages the next 
best firms to leave that exchange in order to 
separate themselves from that pooling equi-
librium. This creates a downward spiral that 
ends with only the lowest quality firms—
the lemons—left on the venture exchange. 
The piA model solves the lemons prob-lem by transferring the quality signal 
from the exchange to the piA. Having a 
highly regarded piA approve a company 
sends a strong signal about firm quality even 
if that firm is trading on an exchange of no 
repute. The firm no longer has to leave the 
exchange in order to separate itself from low 
quality exchange participants because the 
144B exchange creates a reputation market 
for piAs as well as firms.
A highlight of this Article’s 144B pro-
posal is that this rule can be promulgated 
by the SEC without an act of Congress. 
generally, an agency may implement its 
delegated authority through rulemaking. 
When Congress explicitly delegates to an 
agency rulemaking authority to effectuate 
a statute, “[s]uch legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary 
to the statute.” The Exchange Act conferred 
broad, open-ended rulemaking authority on 
the SEC. The JOBS Act also granted specif-
ic rulemaking authority to the SEC to create 
new exemptions to securities regulations. 
general legal principles, rulemaking history, 
and specific statutory language demonstrate 
that the SEC is authorized to promulgate 
Rule 144B.
A 144B safe-harbor exemption—per-
mitting venture exchanges to facilitate 
resale of private-company stock, including 
crowd-funded securities, where a “private in-
dependent analyst” is employed to monitor 
and safeguard investments—may solve the 
economic problems with these secondary 
markets; the successful operation of these 
secondary markets is critical for the orig-
inal-sale exemptions to facilitate efficient 
capital formations. Without a resale exemp-
tion, small, private-company stockholders 
face many disadvantages. Yet a resale exemp-
tion subjects those same small stockholders 
to the risk of fraud in the market. Therefore, 
the solution is to create a resale exemption 
that balances sufficient investor protections 
with limited disclosure requirements. The 
development of liquid, transparent, and 
fair 144B exchanges for the transaction of 
private-company stock could accomplish 
this and thereby facilitate the recycling of 
capital and promote the democratization of 
startups. 
indeed, the development of multiple 
144B exchanges is necessary for efficient 
capital formation. Vibrant competition 
among exchanges will allow the optimal 
combination of disclosure requirements and 
investor protection to evolve. Exchanges 
should be allowed to experiment with var-
ious levels of disclosure requirements and 
investors protections, and these exchanges 
could also facilitate original-sale transac-
“general legal principles, rulemaking history, and specific 
statutory language demonstrate that the SEC is authorized to 
promulgate Rule 144B.”
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tions. The result could be a market for stock 
markets. Original stock issuers, original 
stock purchasers and resale investors could 
shop around for the optimal mix of sun-
light and efficiency. This flexibility would 
help to keep securities regulations from 
becoming quickly outdated as the nature 
of investment changes. The SEC could re-
tain the right to permit only certain types 
of investors into certain markets based on 
risk of the exchange, amount of investment, 
sophistication of investor, age of the issuing 
company, or other factors. The concern for 
the SEC is to avoid creating new financial 
asymmetries by giving the wealthiest inves-
tors exclusive access to the best markets, as it 
did with Rule 144A.
Modernizing securities regulation to 
protect investors while capitalizing the fu-
ture of innovative startups requires a deeper 
review of the entire body of securities regula-
tion, which is the subject of my future work. 
For example, the accredited investor stan-
dard, which is based solely on wealth, could 
potentially be replaced by a more nuanced 
standard of investor sophistication. Modern 
technology, like online feedback tools and 
reputation networks, could provide novel 
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lation problems. The creations of exchanges 
like those contemplated by proposed Rule 
144B could provide a valuable source of 
data that will help scholars and regulators 
determine how to modernize other securi-
ties regulations.
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Download the latest episode of game of Thrones from a peer-2-peer network; operate an internet TV streaming platform; transfer 
eBook files from your computer to your smartphone; 
sing Happy Birthday to You in a crowded restaurant; 
use Marvin gaye’s classic got To give it Up as inspi-
ration for a modern funk-pop song, and in each case 
you commit the ever-expanding tort of copyright in-
fringement. Copyright law grants authors the right to 
control their original creative works. Copying a work 
without the owner’s permission is tortious. As society’s 
ability to generate information increases, the scope of 
that tort widens like falcon’s gyre until it touches upon 
every life in a rapidly sprawling variety of circum-
stances. Copyright now regulates such a vast amount 
of activity that infringement is one of “today’s most 
prevalent form of property tort.”1 And yet, despite the 
growing importance of this tort to the economy, the 
legal system, and our lives, the judicial test used to 
An excerpt from Unbundling the “Tort” of Copyright infringement, 102 Virginia Law Review 
(forthcoming 2016).
unBundling the “tort” of 
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determine infringement is bemoaned 
for its inconsistency and incoherence. 
Copyright’s “infringement analysis” is “a 
mess”2  which makes “no sense,”3  and is 
so complex that it is a “virtual black hole 
in copyright jurisprudence.”4 
The test for copyright infringement is superficially straightforward, but 
in practice beset with doctrinal instabil-
ity. Technically, proving infringement 
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate two 
simple epistemic facts: that the defendant 
copied expression, and that such copying 
lead to the creation of a “substantially 
similar” work. Thereafter, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to prove that the 
copying was non-infringing because it was 
in the service of a “fair use.” However, the 
process of judging similarity has become 
“frustratingly obscure, ambiguous and 
confusing,”5  while the fair use doctrine is 
now so “exceedingly difficult to predict”6 
that some view it as nothing more than 
the “right to hire a lawyer.”7  Three partic-
ular problems highlight the trouble. First 
is the “audience problem.” Who is the 
“audience” who gets to judge whether two 
works are substantially similar: the in-
tended consumers? the ordinary observer? 
experts in the field? Courts go back and 
forth between these standards with very 
little reasoning. Second is the “harm prob-
lem.” The most important question in the 
fair use analysis is whether the defendant’s 
copying is harmful to the copyright own-
er. But what qualifies as harm? For some 
courts, it is the diversion of third party 
demand, for others it is the defendant’s 
own failure to pay a license fee. On occa-
sion some courts are even prepared to find 
harm when the defendant’s copying dis-
rupts the owner’s non-economic interest 
in creative control, privacy, and reputa-
tion. And last but not least is the “analogy 
problem.” if copyright infringement is a 
tort, then what other torts does it most 
resemble? What other parts of private law 
can judges look to for guidance on how 
to design the infringement analysis? But 
while some judges view infringement 
as a property tort, and search the law 
of trespass and conversion for guiding 
principles, others see infringement as a 
form of economic tort, and look to unfair 
competition as the appropriate model for 
designing the infringement test.
 in Unbundling the “Tort” of 
Copyright infringement, i provide a re-
vised positive theory of copyright infringe-
ment law which makes the vagaries of the 
infringement analysis easier to predict. in 
a nutshell, the orthodox theory that copy-
right infringement is one single tort, and 
there is one single infringement analysis, 
is incorrect. A more accurate description 
is that the term “copyright infringement” 
is a group of distinct torts, each with their 
own unique infringement analysis. Using 
an analytic jurisprudence method, i break 
down copyright infringement into five 
distinct “copy-torts” and then show how 
the infringement analysis changes across 
them. Unbundling copyright infringe-
ment in this descriptive manner makes 
it easier for litigants and practitioners to 
predict how courts will apply the infringe-
ment analysis, and provides a blueprint 
for judges struggling to apply the analysis 
in hard cases.  
 First, the orthodox theory that 
copyright infringement is one singular 
wrong is incorrect. There is no “tort of 
land infringement” but instead a group 
of real property torts; there is no “tort of 
chattel infringement” but instead a group 
of personal property torts; and likewise it 
is better to think not of a “tort of copy-
right infringement” but a group of copy-
right-based torts. All of these copy-torts 
involve copying and the author’s exclusive 
right to copy. But the taxonomy reflects 
Patrick R. Goold
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the different interests underlying that 
right, and the different ways copying may 
injure those interests. The five copy-torts 
can be summarized as follows:
1. Consumer Copying occurs when 
a consumer accesses the work rather than 
negotiating for access in the market. 
2. Competitor Copying is commit-
ted by rival producers who copy in order 
to lure consumers away from the copy-
right owner. 
3. Expressive privacy invasion makes 
liable those who publish expression the 
owner is trying to keep confidential. 
4. Artistic Reputation injury sanc-
tions copying that causes deterioration of 
the owner’s professional reputation. 
5. Breach of Creative Control holds 
as tortious acts of decision-making that 
the law designates to the copyright owner.
 
Second, the infringement analysis that courts apply is different in each of these 
different copy-torts. There is no singular 
test for both trespass to land and nuisance, 
or for assault and battery, and neither 
should lawyers expect courts to create a 
uniform test for copyright infringement. 
A defendant’s conduct is tortious only if 
it interferes with a legally protected in-
terest. Copyright’s infringement analysis 
– including both the substantial similarity 
and fair use inquiries – is a judicial test to 
determine whether the defendant’s copy-
ing injures the owner’s legally protected 
interest. But because copyright protects 
multiple interests from different types of 
injury, the infringement analysis simply 
cannot provide a one-size-fits-all tool. 
instead, courts take the generic “infringe-
ment analysis” (copying + substantial 
similarity – fair use = infringement) and 
modify its doctrine, and the theory un-
derlying it, so that it provides a unique 
legal test for each of the different wrongs. 
To illustrate, consider the difference 
between “competitor copying” and “con-
sumer copying” cases. The competitor 
copying wrong occurs where a rival pro-
ducer copies from the copyright owner in 
order to produce consumer demand di-
version. For example, in creating Blurred 
Lines, Robin Thicke and pharrel Williams 
may copy from Marvin gaye’s got To 
give it Up because doing so will cause 
some consumers to forego buying gaye’s 
song, and to buy Blurred Lines instead. 
When copyright owners sue copyists for 
this tort, typically courts adopt the in-
tended consumer viewpoint for assessing 
similarity and the market substitution 
theory of copyright harm. Consumers 
will only “switch” between the two works 
if they view them as economic substitutes, 
and courts typically want some real-world 
evidence of the switch before holding the 
copyist liable. This is highly similar to 
the general unfair competition cause of 
action. 
“[B]ecause copyright protects multiple interests 
from different types of injury, the infringement 
analysis simply cannot provide a one-size-fits-all 
tool.”
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Alternatively, imagine the copyist in the case is not Thicke and Williams, 
but a college student who downloads 
the gaye song from a p2p site like The 
pirate Bay. The copyright owner’s claim is 
no longer like unfair competition – “you 
stole my consumers!” – but is more akin 
to trespass. The owner’s claim is that she 
had the right to exclude individuals from 
the protected subject matter, and indi-
viduals who wish to access it must do so 
through voluntary market negotiation. 
Like the trespasser who jumps the fence, 
the college student has accessed the song 
outside the channels the law desires. in 
these cases, whether two works are “sub-
stantially similar” is usually subjected to 
the “ordinary observer” test. Whether 
consumers should pay the owner depends 
on the underlying “incentive-access” 
tradeoff. The advantage of the “ordinary 
observer” standard is, like the “reasonable 
person” standard elsewhere in tort law, it 
is a legal fiction. There is no real world 
“ordinary observer.” instead, this doctrine 
allows the court to determine whether 
this is a case where the consumer must 
pay the owner in order to ensure an ade-
quate return for the copyright owner, and 
thereafter to label ex post facto the two 
works as “substantially similar” according 
to the fictitious “ordinary” observer. And, 
in the cases where the consumer was un-
der a duty to pay for access, the market 
“harm” is the money that she would have 
paid had she negotiated for access. 
 The following table summarizes 
precisely how courts modify the test for 
copyright infringement depending on 
which copy-tort is in question. 
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This is the latest in a series of articles 
that uses tort theory to help understand 
and evaluate modern copyright infringe-
ment law. in particular, this project was 
inspired by William prosser’s famous 
1961 article, Privacy.8  in that article, 
prosser demonstrated that “privacy inva-
sion” was not one tort, but actually four 
different torts. He demonstrated how 
distinguishing the four torts not only 
made privacy doctrine more predictable, 
but also sharpened our awareness of the 
underlying policy objectives pursued by 
the law. Half a century later, prosser’s 
insight is more relevant than ever in the 
context of today’s sprawling copyright 
law. 
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Discussions of the future of antitrust law (usu-ally known outside the US as “competition law”) are often based on assumptions about 
the role of economics. perhaps the most pivotal of 
these assumptions is that economics can provide a ba-
sis for global competition law convergence. it is piv-
otal because choices and strategies about the future 
shape of global markets and of economic development 
often depend on it. A reduction in differences among 
these systems—often referred to as “convergence”—is 
often seen as the only viable strategy for responding 
to the problems and weaknesses of the current legal 
framework for global markets. To the extent that this 
proposition is accepted, incentives to evaluate or pur-
sue other strategies such as coordination among states 
are reduced. Yet the prospects for convergence rest on 
assumptions about the role of economics in the conver-
gence process, and these assumptions deserve scrutiny.
A summary of Competition Law Convergence: Potential Roles for Economics, in Comparative 
Law and Economics 206, (Theodore Eisenberg & giovanni B. Ramello eds. 2016).
Competition lAw 
ConvergenCe
potential Roles for Economics
By DaviD GerBer
Competition Law Convergence
“The ‘deep’ economic glo-
balization that began in the 
1990s is a key feature of the 
story.”
This Article explores these assumptions and addresses the issue of how and to 
what extent economics can provide a firm 
basis for competition law convergence. 
Discussions of convergence often proceed 
in a kind of abstract haze in which the 
science of economics is expected to be 
central to global convergence, but they 
seldom explain how it can be expected to 
play this role. Our effort here is to dispel 
some of the haze surrounding this issue 
and to suggest a novel and hopefully valu-
able approach to convergence.  
An initial step in this direction is to 
clarify the objectives of a convergence 
strategy. The basic aim of such a strategy is 
to reduce differences among the national 
rules governing competition and thereby 
reduce the costs of doing business across 
borders and improve the efficiency of 
global markets. This, in turn, is expected 
to provide benefits to consumers in richer 
countries and to both producers and con-
sumers in lower income economies. The 
stakes involved in pursuing a convergence 
strategy are, therefore, high.
The term “convergence” is often used 
loosely to refer to reducing differences 
among competition law systems, but the 
term is too vague. The high stakes involved 
in this strategy call for care in identifying 
more precisely what the term means and 
entails. Literally, the term “convergence” 
refers to a process of moving toward a 
point (a “convergence point”). identifying 
that point and analyzing the implications 
of moving toward it thus become critical 
for evaluating the potential of the project. 
The Article focuses on these issues. note 
that this analysis refers to voluntary de-
cisions. Decisions that are coerced or re-
quired involve different issues and do not 
play a part in this analysis.
The Article briefly reviews how the 
convergence strategy came to play such 
a central role in thinking about the fu-
ture of competition law and of global 
markets in general. The “deep” economic 
globalization that began in the 1990s is 
a key feature of the story. it increasingly 
undermined confidence in the jurisdic-
tional system that has long provided the 
legal framework for transborder economic 
relations. Markets were becoming more 
global, but the legal framework was—and 
is—provided by individual states unilat-
erally exercising jurisdiction over conduct 
outside their borders. This system increas-
es costs, uncertainty, and inequality in the 
operation of global markets.   
One response was to seek a coordinat-
ed framework through the newly-formed 
World Trade Organization. Although 
there was support for this initiative, the 
US and some other states preferred con-
vergence as the central response to the 
limitations of the jurisdictional system, 
and this has led to decades of pursuing 
and discussing the convergence strategy.
The Article then reviews the reasons 
given to support the claim that econom-
ics must be central to competition law 
convergence. First, economics is a science 
and therefore universal and neutral. it is 
not tied to culture or to institutions, and 
it does not favor one country or interest 
group over others. Second, it can be ap-
plied anywhere and is therefore global 
in scope. And third, the economics pro-
fession has become an international pro-
fession in which the methods of analysis 
are followed everywhere. There is also a 
political factor. Economics has become 
central to competition law in the US and 
to a growing degree in much of Europe, 
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and therefore convergence will have to 
be based on what these countries do and 
what they would accept.   
The claim that economics must be 
central to the process can easily obscure, 
however, all-important issues about 
HOW it can be expected to play that role. 
The Article reveals that undifferentiated 
assumptions about the role of economics 
are not only likely to create uncertainty 
and impose costs, but also to distort deci-
sions about policy for dealing with these 
pressing problems. Meaningful analysis 
requires careful exploration of what is con-
verging toward what, why, and with what 
consequences. To claim, for example, that 
decision makers are converging or should 
converge toward “more economics” is too 
vague to be of analytical value.   
i suggest that distinguishing among 
the roles or functions of economics in 
competition law and identifying the 
convergence potential of each role as well 
as its implications provides a potentially 
valuable form of analysis. For each role we 
look at several questions. First, to what 
extent is there cognitive alignment among 
the participants in the process? What 
do the decision makers know about the 
relevant issues? Do they share common 
knowledge about and understanding of 
economics? Second, to what extent is 
there institutional/procedural alignment? 
Are the institutions and procedures of 
countries involved in the process suffi-
ciently similar that the abstract principles 
of economic analysis will be translated 
into decisions in similar ways? Finally, 
what are the incentives for the decision 
makers to move toward a particular con-
vergence point?
The Article applies this analysis to 
three basic roles that economics plays in 
competition law. One is descriptive. As a 
social science, the primary tasks of eco-
nomics are to explain phenomena and to 
interpret economic data. Using economics 
for descriptive purposes is, therefore, gen-
erally attractive to decision makers, and if 
economics is increasingly used for these 
purposes in many jurisdictions, there may 
be some indirect effect on convergence. 
The Article points out, however, that such 
an effect would necessarily be indirect 
and limited, and that increased use of 
economics may have the opposite effect.
A second use of economics is nor-
mative. it is the primary focus of con-
vergence discussions. Here the claim is 
that economics should provide the norms 
or standards of conduct for competition 
law—i.e., that the central question in all 
competition law systems should be wheth-
er conduct is “anticompetitive” according 
to economic analysis. if all competition 
law systems were to do this, it is claimed, a 
global standard would emerge that would 
reduce the potential harms inherent in 
the jurisdictional framework. The Article 
looks closely at this claim, identifies its 
potential, and notes its limitations and 
the risks associated with it.
Economic science can also provide, 
however, another point of convergence 
that deserves attention—its role in sup-
plying methods of analysis. Here the claim 
is that increased use of basic economic 
methods can discipline decision making in 
ways that foster convergence. This form of 
convergence does not necessarily require 
particular outcomes, nor does it dictate 
that economics provides the standards of 
conduct to be enforced by competition 
law. it does, however, impose standards on 
the decision-making process that limit the 
range of justifiable outcomes and thereby 
decrease the range of deviation among 
competition law systems. This makes it 
adaptable to the needs, goals and resourc-
es of each jurisdiction, which in turn 
increases incentives for decision makers to 
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increases convergence.
Economic globalization has led to in-
creased awareness of the weaknesses of the 
current legal framework for transnational 
competition, and convergence provides at 
least a partial response to those weakness-
es. The importance of economic science 
in competition law makes it an important 
element of any discussion of convergence. 
Loose references and unfounded assump-
tions about the roles that economics can 
and should play in competition law con-
vergence can, however, cloud and distort 
discussions of the issues. This can, in turn, 
impede the development not only of com-
petition law, but also of global markets and 
economic development around the globe. 
As this Article shows, careful attention 
to the specific roles that economics can 
play in convergence reveals that, if used 
appropriately, it can contribute much to 
improving the legal framework of global 
competition. 
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